ABSTRACT
Türkiye has always been at the center of conflicts, managing to navigate a volatile and sometimes hostile environment to achieve the best possible outcomes for itself. But in order to accomplish this, the country had to cozy up to different sides, although generally seen as a rather dangerously ambiguous partner in the Western security sphere since Erdoğan’s breakaway in 2016. This work will examine how this rather “experimental” stance evolved over time and whether the recent developments around it have a chance to alter it, from how Türkiye operated with its NATO allies throughout the years, and how it is evolving.
Introduction
Türkiye is a country that is stuck between two continents, has multiple identities, and many volatile regions. Combined with the bitter legacy of the fall of the Ottoman Empire, this prompted the relatively young republic (which celebrated its centenary in 2023) to pursue a foreign policy that is seen by many as ambiguous, lukewarm, and rather unpredictable, and question its place in the Western world, in which it masterfully managed to integrate itself. The term ‘masterful’ might seem exaggerated, but this very way of navigating the wild seas of international politics has been an integral part of Turkish foreign policy since the beginning of the post-war era. This runs counter to the prevailing belief that the country has started to shift to an ambiguous position, characterized by the more authoritarian tendencies of its long-time President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan manifested in the early 2010s. In addition, a much softer approach towards Russia in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, a position concerning the Israel-Palestine conflict different from that of its NATO allies, and the attempt to court Chinese efforts to establish a multi-polar world have raised certain questions regarding the country’s loyalty to NATO, which has been a member since 1952, and its close but deteriorated ties with the European Union.
At the same time, Türkiye has become much more cooperative with NATO allies, especially since 2022. Its converging interests in many regions (cooperation with Ukraine in the Black Sea against a possible Russian dominance), increased influence in the Balkans (Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Moldova, and Kosovo are not NATO member states) or Central Asia (Particularly in other Turkic states, with which it shares great political, cultural, and economic ties), and the resumption of its large contributions to the alliance and the member states point towards another possible realignment in the country’s foreign policy, especially towards the United States.
A Short Overview of Turkish Foreign Policy (Post-1950)
Türkiye, since its transition to the Republic after the deposition of the 700-year-long Ottoman dynasty, has aspired to belong to the Western world, aligning its policies for decades. This dream partly came true with the accession to NATO in 1952, and the country immediately started using its strategic position to expand the alliance’s influence in the region and limit that of the USSR. This can be seen in the cases of the Second Balkan Pact with Greece and Yugoslavia (1954) and the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) (1955-79) with the UK, Iran, Pakistan, and Iraq (until 1958). After the 1960s, Türkiye pursued a more balanced foreign policy (although mostly in line with its most important ally, the United States), even receiving Soviet aid and investment in the 1960s [21]. However, the first major crack with its partners appeared with the Cypriot question, which deepened the rift between Greece and Türkiye, leading to a change in perceptions of the United States as the country’s major ally and the primacy of the interests of NATO as the founding stone of its foreign policy.
The threats of Kurdish separatism, Islamic terrorism, and the aspirations to join the European Union (then the European Community) in the 1980s framed Turkish foreign policy as focused on “creating as many options as possible” and wider cooperation with Islamic countries, such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, and former Soviet Republics, particularly Armenia, recognizing it just minutes after the fall of the Soviet Union. Therefore, despite its socioeconomic woes, the legal and political reforms necessary to join the union evidenced Türkiye’s realignment with the West after decades of tension following the Invasion of Cyprus in 1974.
This honeymoon post-1980 period extended to Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party, which came to power after an electoral landslide in 2002. The rhetoric on Turkish membership in the EU remained, becoming a primary goal and culminating at the beginning of the full EU membership procedure after the Copenhagen Summit of 2006. During those years, some cracks occurred, most significantly the “Hood Incident” [24] in 2003 and Sarkozy’s infamous visit to Ankara in 2011 [6], which could have been interpreted as an imparing rapprochement between Erdoğan and his Western allies.
Things started to take the present shape after the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War in 2011, when Türkiye supported the Syrian rebels’ fight against the government of Assad [14] and its involvement in other regime changes, particularly in Egypt [16]. However, as the war progressed and other actors, such as Iran and Russia, engaged, Turkish activity in the region was confronted by them, resulting in several clashes. The most significant of these was the infamous downing of a Russian fighter jet in 2015 [15] in the Turkish airspace, which nearly triggered direct armed conflict between the two countries.
The most significant influence on Türkiye’s foreign policy came from a 2016 coup [18] against Erdoğan by members of the Gülen movement, which is now classified as a terrorist organization. With its failure, many of those involved had to flee abroad, which revived the decades-old issue of NATO member-states harboring groups designated by Türkiye as terroristic. While the U.S. kept Fethullah Gülen, the now-dead leader of the movement, Germany accepted thousands of asylum seekers [5] who escaped the subsequent purges in Türkiye. The latter drew the criticism of its allies towards Türkiye, combined with accusations of lasting human rights abuses committed by the country, further deepening the rift. The situation prompted the country to start once again looking for foreign-policy alternatives found in Russia, further strengthening their ties at the expense of exclusion from alliance-wide projects, particularly the F35 5th Generation Fighter Jet program [25].
This policy also continued at the start of this decade, with the country always suspected of blocking key agreements needed for the defense of the allies in the east for mostly marginal returns. However, the change occurred in 2022, with Türkiye taking a mediating role in the Russia-Ukraine conflict and slowly re-aligning its foreign policy approach with that of the alliance. Despite juggling with the idea of joining BRICS and still treating Russia as a potential partner rather than an adversary like the rest of NATO states, the wider developments indicate a more cooperative Türkiye and NATO leadership being more eager to accept diverging opinions of the member states. This situation, combined with the upcoming Trump U.S. presidency, can potentially influence Turkish policies and result in a full or partial abandonment of the “middle ground” approach pursued since 2016.
Converging Interests and Russia as a Rival
Despite the unclear role of Türkiye in NATO and the years of rifts between the country and the rest of its allies, they still have converging interests. One revolves around the Black Sea, which has been the main field of competition for Russian and Turkish dominance for centuries. Even though there have been no clashes between the two powers for decades now, Russia, weakened in the war with Ukraine, corresponds to Turkish interests, and so to those of the United States and the rest of NATO. Even though there is no public indication that the Turkish government directly perceives Russia as a threat and rival, the push of Türkiye to obtain a position that is more favorable for itself and its allies, including both NATO and non-NATO states in the region, rather than Russia, is still evident.
Another converging interest lies in the rapidly developing Turkish arms industry, which has held a major position among more experienced producers for more than a decade. Despite challenges stemming from poor human capital, insufficient providers of critical elements, and partial arms embargoes inflicted by EU countries, the Turkish arms industry has been paramount in providing both Türkiye and its allies with state-of-the-art weapons necessary in a modern battlefield and instrumental in aiding Ukraine, particularly at the beginning of the war. [20] NATO has been mostly supportive of Turkish efforts to develop “emerging and disruptive technologies” through its NATO-Private Sector Dialogues Initiative, reaffirmed at the new Secretary-General Mark Rutte’s meeting with the Turkish leadership on November 25, 2024. [11]
Türkiye as a Mediator
Despite its rather controversial place in world politics, the country has successfully played the role of mediator between various conflicting parties, having recently brokered a prisoner swap with Russia. [3]
The last couple of years have been particularly rough for many Western democracies’ relations with Africa, as many of the allied regimes, particularly in the Sahel region, have been overthrown by military coups, and these countries have become hotspots for Russian paramilitary and private militia activities. Although many of these countries have cut ties with many NATO powers (particularly France) [4], Türkiye remains an active and recognized power (in terms of Turkish soft power, active economic ties, and arms sales) in Africa, exerting its influence from Somalia to Nigeria.
Furthermore, Türkiye uses the Organization of Turkic States (which it co-founded after the fall of the Soviet Union) as a way to sell itself as an alternative to Russia in Central Asian states, with which it shares many cultural, political, and linguistic ties. Such an approach might prove beneficial for NATO, as many of these countries (particularly Kazakhstan) are also at the top of the resources critical for the production of electronics, nuclear energy, and chemicals.
Türkiye’s mediating role might provide an alliance with what it needs to establish partnerships beyond the Euro-Atlantic zone. However, it can only be sustainable in scenarios in which the country does not have any secondary considerations (such as religious ties in the Israel-Palestine conflict).
The Second Trump Presidency – What to Expect?
The situation is further complicated by Trump’s reelection, considering his approach to global crises. However, the question is quite nuanced given the personal relations between Erdoğan and Trump (a relationship that began before Trump’s presidency, and despite deterioration, there were successful attempts from the Turkish side to restore that) [7], which will play a considerable role in Turkish-American relations just as during Trump’s first term.
Possible areas of cooperation are opening up for the two countries, especially considering Trump’s emphasis on higher contributions to be made by alliance members (in which Türkiye has already exceeded the 2% threshold) [11] and a more lukewarm approach to Russia. At the same time, questions are looming over how the differences will influence the relations between the two, given Trump’s hawkish positions regarding Israel and Palestine and Türkiye’s juggling with the idea of joining BRICS, which might not have played out during Trump’s presidency.
One thing one can be certain is that prompted by Türkiye’s much weaker economic position compared to that during Trump’s first term and having already been damaged during that period (the S400 Crisis, Pastor Brunson Crisis, and Trump’s threat regarding Kurdish forces in Syria), both Türkiye and Erdoğan personally might cozy up to the demands of the United States and might attempt to converge its policies with that of the US.
Conclusion
Ambiguous Turkish foreign policy is nothing new and will remain as such in the foreseeable future. However, there have also been moments in which the country took or had to take a clearer stance on the international stage. We might be approaching a similar stage, as can be seen from both the most recent contributions of Türkiye to the alliance during negotiations over the grain corridor for Ukraine [10], its aircraft support sent for air policing to the Baltics [17], and its reiterated responsibilities to ensure security in the Black Sea [19].
On the other hand, the NATO leadership’s acceptance of Türkiye’s volatility and its more balanced approach towards Russia promises to provide more aid for Turkish defense industries [20]. Türkiye’s recent arms deal with Germany (first in nearly a decade) guaranteeing the purchase of Eurofighter Typhoon jets [2], and the hardline stance of Trump might influence Türkiye’s position on the international stage.
“The Turkish Experiment” will not come to an end in the near future, especially considering the dependency on cheap Russian gas and wide cooperation with the country in the energy sector (i.e. Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant) [8] and areas of distrustful cooperation in Syria and the Caucasus are still not off the conversation. However, from the medium- and long-term perspectives, Türkiye might be re-aligned with its NATO allies after a decade of tensions until another crisis occurs. One can wait to see how events will unfold in the future. The Turkish experiment has already met reality, but it is not over now.
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