Destruction of the Syrian Armed Forces

ABSTRACT

On the 8th of December, Israel launched strikes on multiple targets within Syria in an air campaign, the largest campaign carried out by the Israeli Air Force over 50 years [19]. The extensive air campaign was initiated hours after the fall of the Syrian Arab Republic and the last-minute evacuation by the ruling Bashar Al-Assad regime. The motive behind the air campaign is the prevention of advanced weapon systems and alleged chemical weapons from falling into the hands of rebels, with their stance towards Israel remains unclear at the moment. This paper examines the objectives of the Israeli Air Force campaign over Syria starting from the 8th of December and the magnitude of the Israeli strikes against Syrian military assets. This article also serves as a preliminary analysis of the campaign’s effect on the Syrian Armed Forces, determining the damage caused by the Israeli Air Force raids. Given that there are very few to no official military assessments regarding the topic, the coverage is limited to “alleged” damages inflicted by Israeli forces on Syrian assets. The article then moves on to the prospects of the rebel-controlled Syrian Armed Forces. To approach the subject thoroughly, a historical overview of the Ba'athist era Syrian military (1963-2011) is provided together with an analysis of the Syrian Arab Army arsenal and military hardware. Finally, this paper discusses the damage inflicted by Israeli strikes on specific military assets and the future of the Syrian military.

The Syrian Land, Air, and Naval Military Assets Prior to the Civil War (1963-2011)

Before delving into the Israeli Air Force operation over Syria, Syria’s military history is explored to shed light on the evolution of the Syrian Arab Army from 1963 onwards.

In the Arab world, the Syrian military is generally considered a moderate armed force. It has a long tradition of involvement in Arab-Israeli conflicts, particularly in the 1948, 1967, and 1973 wars, as well as in inner-Arab clashes, including the 1970 Jordanian Civil War [31] and the 1975 Syrian invasion of Lebanon [20].  Upon its independence in 1945, the Syrian state was embroiled in the First Arab-Israeli War of 1948, where its military performed rather poorly, failing to advance into Palestine and halting the Transjordanian offensive into parts of Arab Palestine, as previously endeavored by Damascus [22]. The resulting discontent and alleged military corruption produced a cycle of coups and countercoups between 1948 and 1963, with a total number of seven military takeovers. The 1963 coup d’ état introduced Ba'athism, or Arab socialism, which is characterized by nationalist rhetoric coupled with socialist approaches to governance. 

The relative stability brought by the new official ideology to domestic politics until the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War in 2011 refined Damascus’s navigation of Cold War dynamics. Initially, the 1963 takeover pioneered by figureheads like Michel Aflaq hinted at flirting with the USSR, given the ideological similarities of Ba'athism with Soviet communism, as well as the changing geopolitics of the Middle East. The Turkish accession to NATO and growing US involvement with Israel pushed Soviet leaders to seek a secure foothold in the region, which was satisfied by the subsequent warming of Soviet-Syrian relations. The USSR supplied the Syrian Arab Army with top-notch Soviet military hardware, and sent advisors to train Syrian officers. According to military assessments by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, [8] Soviet assistance to Syria culminated after the lagging performance of the Syrian Arab Army in the 1973 Yom Kippur War, evidenced by the amplification of the Syrian Armed Forces’ manpower. Declassified US Department of Defense papers point out the soaring number of Syrian personnel from roughly 50.000 to 200.000 between 1966 and 1977 [9], owing to Soviet financial and material aid that boosted the conscription and acquisition of weapons systems.

By the early 1980s, the Syrian Arab Army’s inventory consisted of 3700 tanks and 1600 armored personnel carriers acquired solely from the USSR, while its armor was made of 2.200 Soviet-made T-55/54s, 1100 T-62s, and 400 more up-to-date pieces of T-72 main battle tanks [6]. More T-72s followed later, as the military reportedly operated nearly 1500 T-72s in 2013 [44]. All 1600 Syrian personnel carriers in 1980 were Soviet BTR 40/50/60s [9]. The Syrian infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) inventories, 2550 BMP-1 and BMP-2s, were similarly produced in the Soviet Union [44]. The Syrian military was equipped with all-Soviet-made self-propelled guns and howitzers, towed guns, and lower-caliber mortars, such as the 2S1 Gvozdika, 152 mm D-20 howitzer, and M240 towed mortar [44]. This artillery stockpile was built in 10 years, from the mid-1970s to the late 1980s, and remained in service until the breakup of the Syrian Civil War in 2011. Other logistics and engineering equipment of the Syrian military, such as the MTU-67 armored vehicle-launched bridge, was supplied by the Soviet Union.

Throughout the late 1980s, Syria showed very limited indigenization of arm manufacturing. Unguided systems lacking precision, such as the 302 mm rocket Khaibar-1, were introduced in the early 2000s [2]. Such weaponry was later distributed across Iran’s Axis of Resistance proxy militia groups like Hezbollah in Lebanon, with large quantities of Khaibar-1s being captured by Israeli forces in its 2006 Lebanon incursion. Syrian-manufactured light rocket systems were later used by both rebel and government forces during the Civil War because of their mass availability and easy operability.

The Syrian T-72 battle tank, upgraded with a reactive armor during the Syrian Civil War. Most Cold War-era Soviet armor in the Syrian military was upgraded with modern components to fit 21st-century warfare standards.

The 152 mm D-20 howitzer and BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) operated by the Syrian Arab Army.

The Syrian Arab Air Force (SAAF) is an extensive but antiquated fighting force [35] operating almost only Soviet-era equipment, dating back to the 1970s-1980s. Its main component is a fixed-wing attack aircraft ranging from Su-22s, MiG-29s, to MiG-25s, with approximately 600 aircraft in total [17], although the exact numbers remain unknown. Su-22s enabled the SAAF to conduct close-air support and strike missions and are likely to have been largely employed in support of the Syrian army infantry during the early stages of the Civil War. The MiG fleet provides Air Force flexibility in performing multirole missions in terms of ground support and air-to-air combat. However, despite the SAAF’s numerical strength, many of these aircraft proved to be out of service amidst the pressing spare parts requirements, maintenance, and training to keep the aircraft in a mission-capable status [17]. Given the operational costs and technical issues in conducting ground attack missions with Soviet-era fighter jets, lighter aircraft (L-39 Albatros) [17] and helicopter gunships [35] (Mi-24s) are employed for battlefield support.

The SAAF conducted successful aerial bombardments and close-air-support missions against rebel forces in the early years of the Civil War in the summer of 2012 [17]. Nevertheless, because of SAAF’s degrading capabilities, it failed to change the course of the conflict. What proved effective was the Russian air campaign in Syria that started in September 2015 as part of the broader Russian intervention in Syria and took over the SAAF’s ground support and combat roles. The Russian Aerospace Forces assisted the Assad regime’s recapture of territory initially lost to the rebels and, together with the coalition forces, reversed the advances of the Islamic State (ISIS) [34]. As the Russian Aerospace Forces took over the SAAF’s air combat role, the Syrian aircraft remained secondary on the battlefield and assumed logistical duties, such as providing mobility to the army by helicopter and transport aircraft such as IL-76 [17], as well as ground attacks by lighter L-39s.

Overall, the SAAF struggled to respond to the insurgency of the rebel army and its unconventional warfare methods. Its air warfare doctrine focused on confrontation with Israel conducted through traditional means; therefore, it was unprepared to fight the rebellion. The deployment of a light L-39 training aircraft for close-air support missions has proven the lack of adequate equipment to fight an asymmetric war [3].

Contrary to the land and air branches of Syrian armed forces, the navy remains moderately underequipped. The Syrian Navy operated Romeo class Soviet submarines and three Petya III class frigates built in the 1960s [11], which formed its backbone prior to the 2010s. However, vessels were reported to be out of service during the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War in 2011 [11] The Syrian Navy is tasked with protecting the country’s 193-kilometer-long coastline and keeping the major ports of Latakia and Tartus in a state of war with Israel [11].

Following Romeo’s and Petya’s withdrawal from service, it turned to Iran to resupply its fleet [42]. Iran presumably sold the Syria MIG-S series rapid patrol boats, enhancing the operational capabilities of the Syrian Navy. The fast attack craft enables the Syrian Navy to damage enemy naval assets without sending heavy vessels, similar to the approach employed by Iran in the Persian Gulf, the so-called “guerilla warfare in the sea” [6]. However, Syrian naval capabilities remain far below those of Iran.

In addition to the Iranian vessels, the Syrian Navy maintained Soviet-made fast attack crafts, namely Osa-1 and Osa-2s [11], which strengthened its mobility. The Syrian coastal defense units aimed at protecting Tartus and Latakia ports and keeping them functional in times of war are equipped with traditional 130 and 100 mm Soviet towed anti-aircraft guns and other Cold War-era surface-to-surface cruise missiles batteries like SS-N-3s and the SS-N-2 “Styx” anti-ship missiles. In addition, the Syrian Navy acquired new Russian SS-N-26 supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles as part of Russia’s initiative to fortify Syria’s coastal defense outposts to protect its enlarging naval facilities in the port of Tartus. Simultaneously, a robust coastal defense ensured by the Soviet and subsequent Russian presence in Tartus port prompted Israel to deploy new SS-N-26 cruise missiles’ supersonic cruising capabilities in early 2010 [11].

The Russian SS-N-26 “Strobile” supersonic cruise missile battery capable of reaching targets within the range of 600 kilometers. The variant sent to Syria is believed to be the “Yakhont” export version [11], with a radius of 300 km.

Overall, the Syrian Armed Forces were equipped and trained for a conventional scenario involving war with Israel along the Golan frontier. Its structure indicates preparedness for a potential confrontation with Israel, exemplified by the acquisition of the MiG-25 interceptor aircraft for downing Israeli aerial refueller KC-130s. Similarly, the Syrian Navy’s anti-submarine-warfare drill and exercises after 1985 [11] involving the decommissioned Romeo submarines are directed at countering Israel’s submarine fleet that might be sent for reconnaissance missions off-coast Syria. The adoption of a new irregular naval warfare doctrine with Iranian rapid-attack crafts and boosted coastal defense could demonstrate the Syrian military’s transformation before the Civil War to withstand a direct confrontation with Israel’s regular naval assets. The prior Syrian failures to defeat the Israeli military in the wars of 1967 and 1973 revealed the incompetence of Soviet-equipped Syrian armed forces in countering a Western-style army. These failures could be attributable to the misemployment of Cold War-era Soviet military hardware principally configured to confront Allied militaries in NATO’s eastern and southern flanks. In terms of numerical superiority, foundational to Warshaw Pact armies [42], the Syrian military always fell behind Israel [8], with the Soviet-supplied equipment proving inadequate for Syrian-case warfare.

The conventional constraints of the Syrian military encouraged Damascus to alter its defense focus towards aerial defense and the procurement of advanced weaponry to better deal with Israeli threats in the future. Additionally, the Syrian military launched its indigenous chemical weapons program [5] using sophisticated delivery methods, including Scud missile systems [5]. The Syrian military is believed to have started developing artillery-based chemical weapon delivery systems as early as the 1980s, with its chemical weapons stockpile consisting of advanced agents such as somans and VX [5], before Assad’s fall. The Scud system, with several hundred missiles [25], can reach targets within Israel, and because of Iran’s assistance, it was successfully installed by Syria, together with repair lines, prior to the Civil War, while unknown numbers of facilities were dispersed around the country. The procurement of Scud missiles was aimed at strategic deterrence of Israel in the early 1980s, and the trend of investing in advanced weaponry continued thereafter.

In the early 2000s, however, the Iranian-made Fateh-100 missile system was reportedly purchased by Syria [25] to diversify its ballistic missile weaponry and compensate for the aging Scuds. The country is also believed to be capable of domestically producing variants of the Iranian Fateh missile [4], and a number of systems have been shipped to Lebanese Hezbollah over the years [4]. In addition to Tehran’s commitment to arm Syria’s advanced weaponry, China allegedly attempted to provide DF-15 missiles to Syria with unconfirmed success [40]. If true, DF-15s would be the most up-to-date ballistic missile system operated by the Syrian military.

The past two decades have demonstaded an incrasignly growing Syrian reliance on Iran to acquire advanced weaponry. This growing reliance suggests Iran’s enlarging military buildup in the country in parallel with the Axis of Resistance agenda to keep the Golan front operational against Israel. Nevertheless, the breakup of the Syrian Civil War significantly hampered Syria’s initiative to indigenize its advanced weapons production capacity, largely with the help of Iran, as the Iranian IRGC took direct control over Syrian advanced weapons manufacturing and established its own sites across the country.

Syrian Scud missile launchers.

To sum up, Syria’s ballistic missile arsenal posed a moderate threat to Israel. Advancements in Israeli ballistic missile defense systems, such as the development of Arrow anti-ballistic missiles [40], secured the country against Syrian Scuds. Nevertheless, Israel would not manage to down all Scud and similar ballistic missiles launched simultaneously from Syria in a potential full-out war. This uncertainty, coupled with the possibility of advanced missile systems falling into the hands of radical rebel groups, kept Israel worried about the presence of such weapons in Syria, manifested in the regular Israeli airstrikes deep inside Syrian territory, targeting missile hangars and launch sites.

Israeli Air Force Operation to Dismantle the Syrian Military

2. 

   

   Israeli Air Force hitting Syrian airfields to render aircraft out of operation.

   Israeli Interventions in Syria Prior to and During the Civil War

   
   

   The magnitude of Israeli airstrikes in Syria gradually escalated into what is today called Israel’s largest air campaign. There is no precise start date for airstrikes, as the Israeli Air Force (IAF) targeted Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) training camps located in Syria already in the 1970s-1980s. Israel took decisive action against conventional threats from Syria during the late Cold War. Codenamed “Operation Mole Cricket 19”, the IAF campaign hitting Syrian air defense batteries during the 1982 Lebanon War demonstrated Israel’s preparedness to neutralize threats within Syria using nothing but mere airpower [43]. Israeli success in Syria during the Operation, namely the destruction of surface-to-air (SAM) missile batteries on the ground and nearly 30 Syrian MiG jets with no casualties, positioned the IAF at the forefront of Israel’s preliminary first-strike doctrine [43]. After the end of the Cold War, Israel became more occupied by countering the growing Iranian presence in Syria, in particular its assistance to re-erect Syria’s air defenses and to install sites providing self-sufficiency to the Syrian military, such as missile assembly and repair sites, in addition to the threat posed by Syrian chemical weapons.

   
   

   Israel’s concerns were enhanced by Iran’s proxy network in Syria, including the Quds Force and Hezbollah formations [26]. In 2007, Israel tested its preliminary airstrike capabilities aimed at tackling the renewed threat in the so-called “Operation Outside the Box” that destroyed a suspected Syrian nuclear site located in the eastern part of the country [26]. As a result, Israel was dragged into a long and costly aerial attrition campaign in Syria with continuous airstrikes in an attempt to dampen Iranian proxy activity in the country.

   
   

   The outbreak of the 2011 Civil War [36], with the Iranian direct military assistance positioning the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) across the border with Israel, triggered a drastic surge in IAF airstrikes, reaching 48 airstrikes in various locations in Syria at its peak in 2022 [36]. Syrian missiles and research development sites built and operated with Iranian assistance have become targets of recurrent attacks aimed at preventing the deployment of advanced strategic missile systems capable of hitting Israel in Syria. Simultaneously, throughout the Syrian Civil War, the IAF carried limited attacks against Assad regime troops as part of its policy of non-intervention in the Civil War, keeping airstrikes directed at Iranian proxy presence [36]. An exception was the Syrian infrastructure used for military purposes, including airfields such as al-Tayyas Airbase and Damascus International Airport [36]. The latter IAF airstrikes forced Iran to forward its aerial supply route to the Assad regime and proxies from Damascus to the Aleppo Airport in 2022. Nevertheless, Israeli attacks on Aleppo Airport the following year disrupted Iran’s efforts [36].

   
   

   Overall, Israeli airstrikes across Syria before the Civil War were conducted to contain Iran’s influence in Syria and hamper its proxy operations. Consequently, the attacks curbed Syria’s indigenous missile procurement capabilities and restrained the Assad regime’s response to combatting rebel forces. However, the airstrikes did not prevent loyalist forces from reattaining command to assert dominance on the battlefield, whereas Israel successfully contained threats posed by Syrian strategic weapons. 

   The Israeli Airforce Campaign (8th of December-Present)

   
   

   The main thrust of the IAF’s air campaign during the Syrian Civil War was initiated on December 8, 2024, followed by Assad’s evacuation of Damascus. The airstrikes opened a new chapter in the campaign, with Israel accurately hitting and destroying Syria’s strategic military assets amidst chaos and uncertainty unfolding in the country. The rationale behind recent attacks is to prevent Syria’s Scud and Fateh-type ballistic missiles and alleged chemical weapons stockpiles from falling into the hands of rebel groups [12]. Israel is particularly concerned about splinter groups that may arise within the ranks of Hay’ at Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS), the main opposition group toppling Assad allegedly linked before radical extremist groups such as Al Qaeda. On the other hand, Israel seeks to render the Syrian military dysfunctional in the long run to neutralize any future threats that may arise across its Golan frontier. By successfully dismantling the Syrian military, Israel aimed at zeroing the Iranian presence in Syria and ruling out any supply route through which Iran might try to rearm Hezbollah following its setbacks in Lebanon this year. A Syrian state lacking heavy weaponry results in no more cover for Iranian operations, thus effectively crippling the Axis of Resistance. Moreover, the Israeli decision to decapitate the Syrian military might have been triggered by the expected political uncertainty in the post-Asad country, which may fall into disarray if the new rebel interim government falls short of stabilizing the country. Finally, a future Syrian disarmed from anti-aircraft weaponry could enable the IAF to conduct far-reaching operations inside Iran, given no threats to the IAF aerial refueller tanker aircraft, such as the KC-46s posed by Syrian S-300s.

   
   

   The examination of the IAF’s recent campaign from the 8th of December onwards is challenging because of the uncertainty in terms of military classification and the fact that the operation is still ongoing. Therefore, assessments are limited to on-ground visual confirmation and official releases by IAF authorities. Militarily, the IAF targets can be categorized according to their prioritization, with strategic weapons (missile sites and chemical weapon stockpiles) being the highest priority, followed by the Syrian military infrastructure (airfields and ports harboring air and naval assets) and the latest category of heavy weapons (including tank and armored vehicle inventory, vessels, and air defense systems). In the early raids of the air campaign, the IAF concentrated its firepower on the first category of strategic missiles to neutralize the more imminent threat factor. The main facilities included weapons and ammunition storage sites in northeastern Deir ez Zor province and seven former Syrian military bases near Damascus and across southwestern Syria [12]. These targets are likely to have been chosen because of intelligence indicating the potential harboring of Scud and Fateh missile systems there, as well as assembly lines and repair facilities for missile maintenance and production built with Iranian assistance. Arguably, the Deir ez Zor ammunition depot destroyed by airstrikes was used to stock weapons provided by Iran to its proxies as the site was operated under the IRGC [18].

   
   

   A statement by Israeli officials on the 9th of December confirms that the former Syrian Arab Army bases struck by the IAF were targeted to prevent chemical weapons and strategic weapons, such as ballistic missiles, from falling into the wrong hands [13]. Within two days, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) announced the destruction of 70-80% of Syria’s military capabilities [14], which suggests that the IAF strikes neutralized the Syrian army inventory of tanks, artillery, and armored carrier pieces, together with its strategic missile assets. Moreover, on the 10th of December, the Israeli Navy assaulted the Latakia port to tear down the Syrian fleet [15]. The visuals from the attack site confirm the destruction of the upgraded Osa-class missile boats from the Soviet era, although the exact number of vessels that sunk remains unknown [15]. Similarly, the IDF reported the dismantlement of coastal defense batteries, including anti-ship missile systems [14]. It appears that the Syrian navy was either fully sunken or dysfunctional, with its coastline exposed to further attacks.

   
   

   In the second week of the campaign, the IAF went on striking former Syrian army sites and warehouses near Latakia and Damascus, and struck the Mezzeh military airport [6]. The Former Syrian Air Force airbases near Damascus and T4 airport came under attack, resulting in the destruction of Syrian Su-22 and Su-24 fighter jet squadrons [35].

   
   

   Additional blows were delivered to Syrian air and UAV fleets in airbases near Damascus [33]. On December 14th, the IAF attacked military communication sites and antennas targeting Syria’s electronic warfare infrastructure [16]. Geolocated imagery continued to track down the IAF raids with a decreasing number of sorties, signaling that the objectives were mostly secured during the first week of raids. On the 16th of December, it was officially asserted that IAF strikes neutralized over 90% of the identified strategic surface-to-air missiles (SAM) [41], rendering Syrian skies defenseless. As of January 2025, the IAF continues to target Syrian assets, with a focus shifted toward ammunition production facilities [38], since military inventory has already been depleted. IAF strikes are likely to continue occasionally, albeit with less intensity.

   
   

   Both the on-ground visuals and official releases affirm that the IAF achieved most of its objectives, having destroyed Syria’s strategic weaponry (over 90%) during the first week of the ongoing air campaign. Contrary to official statements, secondary on-ground reports suggest more moderate damage inflicted upon Syria’s missile forces [37], commenting on visuals from the alleged military base of the former 155th Missile Brigade of the Syrian army, with undamaged R-17 missiles stored in underground shelters [37]. It is difficult to assess whether such imagery falls into the remaining 10% of the strategic assets left outside the scope of the IAF or, rather, suggests a greater operational failure of the IAF. Either way, the Israeli air campaign greatly hampered Syria’s strategic offensive and defensive capabilities, regardless of the accuracy of official numbers.

   The Troubled Future of the Syrian Military

   
   

   Regardless of the extent of the damage inflicted by Israeli air force strikes, whoever takes control of Syria will inherit a torn-down military. The land, air, and naval assets of the former Syrian Arab Republic were made of old Soviet equipment, and adequate upgrades will be difficult to acquire. Syria is likely to have no offensive military capabilities in the future and its defensive assets remain neglected.

   
   

   The unification of the fractioned rebel forces under the banner of Syrian armed forces, hence in a single army, might be challenging given the persistent political differences among the rebel forces that toppled Assad [33]. The HTS, the main fighting group, is an umbrella of Sunni Islamist groups that evolved from the Nusrah Front, Al Qaeda’s Syrian branch [27]. Despite HTS’s alleged pivot away from its fundamentalist agenda [1], other armed groups may not agree with its conservative approach to Syria’s future. Among them, the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) operates in the northern parts of Syria. HTS has long had a strained relationship with the SNA [1] and is now forced to consider reconciliation under a united Syria initiative. Other hardline groups, such as Ansar al-Tawhid, which took part in the latest offensive, called their fighters to retain their arms, preventing HTS from immediately consolidating power over post-Assad Syria and further complicating the creation of a centralized chain of military command. To make matters worse, third-party armed groups, such as the Syrian Defense Forces (SDF) that control large portions of territory beyond the east bank of the Euphrates River, are in conflict with the HTS. The SDF initially joined the anti-Assad offensive but later came into a clash with the HTS over the city of Deir ez Zor [39], signaling that the two groups maintain an adversarial relationship.

   
   

   Nevertheless, the new Syrian interim government took steps to integrate the armed groups into a single army. A meeting was set on the 3rd of January the year after the new staff of the Syrian Ministry of Defense discussed the integration of their forces under the ministry with rebel leaders [32]. The chief of HTS-affiliated and independent armed groups, whose backgrounds can be traced back to the Free Syrian Army in 2011 and the Sham Legion formed in 2014 [32], were present. The outcomes of the initiative are not clear, yet it demonstrates the interim government’s efforts to include smaller rebel factions in the state defense apparatus. Furthermore, foreign fighters are appointed to high-ranking positions within the military, including those from Albania, Tajikistan, and China’s East Turkestan region, having partaken in the latest HTS-led offensive [23]. Apart from a potential blowback from their countries of origin [23], such an approach raises concerns about Syria’s potential transformation into a “terrorist haven” like Afghanistan under the former Taliban regime. The regime’s ability to refrain from becoming a safe sanctuary for extremist groups appears to depend highly on the formation of a strong, centralized armed force.

   
   

   The Syrian Defense Ministry is expected to face great challenges in the future. The legitimacy of the new government will partially depend on its ability to reassemble the shattered command and control of the military from years-long warfare and, therefore, the containment of new extremist threats that may emerge from within. On the one hand, the disbandment of armed groups would reduce arms circulation. The lack of strategic and heavy weaponry following its destruction by the IAF may help reduce the militarization index of Syria and pave the way for better arms control policies by the new interim government, encouraging world powers to lift sanctions imposed during the Civil War on Syria [10]. Moreover, the dismantlement of Syrian chemical weapons delivery assets and their stockpiles could reduce the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction and curb their further proliferation in the MENA region.

   
   

   On the other hand, a country may find itself defenseless against external aggression for a long time. The recent IAF destruction campaign in Syria came hand-in-hand with the IDF crossing the Golan ceasefire line, resulting in Israel’s capture of the Syrian side of Mount Hermon [21]. Israeli units are reported to have encountered no Syrian resistance [29], expanding their occupation zone further into the southern region of Quneitra [29]. Israel affirms that the measure was necessary to enlarge the buffer zone given the uncertainty unfolding in post-Assad Syria and warns about the future extension of the allegedly temporary occupation if Israel’s security concerns are not satisfied [30]. It might be too early to argue that the idle state of the Syrian military perpetuates occupation. However, the Syrian army’s absence of heavy weaponry complicates its response to incursions by other parties.

   
   

   Material loss assessment appears challenging with no institutionalized or structured framework. Currently, the Syrian interim government is working on putting together the pieces of the Assad regime’s shattered defense ministry, making it easier to study the reorganized structure of the Syrian armed forces. What is evident, however, is the fundamentally changed power dynamics in the Middle East, tilting the balance of power by leaving behind Syria lacking the military. More time is needed to observe whether this power vacuum will give birth to further escalation between Israel and Iran or calm down the waters by persuading Iran to abandon its Axis of Resistance. The absence of Syria presents an opportunity for disarmament in the Levant, and a potential catalyst for Israel. 

   
   

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